This year’s World Economic Forum took place amid turbulent transatlantic relations. Donald Trump has renewed his plans for “getting” Greenland, threatening to annex part of a NATO ally. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine rages on, while the peace talks have stalled. What is the state of the European discussion on relations with the U.S.? Can Europe support Ukraine while managing its own domestic challenges and a volatile U.S. foreign policy? What are Western leaders thinking in terms of their Russia strategy?

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Alexander Gabuev. Welcome to the Carnegie Politika podcast. My name is Alexander Gabuev. I'm director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin and the host. Today is an episode that we owe our listeners that was supposed to drop last week, but unfortunately I was consumed by the World Economic Forum in Davos. And we're going to unpack what happened there and why is that important for the international order, for Russia and the trajectory of [the] Russia-Ukraine war. And there is no one more competent to help us to do that than our guest today, the Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator of the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman. Welcome, Gideon. 

Gideon Rachman. Thanks, Sasha. Good to see you.

Gabuev. It's so great to see you. It's interesting that our podcast - well, you have a weekly podcast with a huge listeners. And I have a tiny little podcast, but with people who are interested or working on our region, and they are listening [to] that. We actually release that on Thursdays, all the time. So in terms of competition, I have you and Dan Kurtz-Phelan, the editor of the Foreign Affairs Interview that also drops on Thursday. So it's an interesting reverse of roles because I've been to your podcast a couple of times and I've enjoying that immensely, and I'm putting you in the hot seat. We bumped into each other in Davos, but we didn't really have time to discuss the madness over there. So let's do it right now. 

Rachman. Sure. And thank you, incidentally, for coming on my podcast so many times. Always good value.

Gabuev. It's always a pleasure.

Rachman. I can hardly say no to you, but given that - anyway, let's go. 

Gabuev. So I guess my impression that this Davos has been dominated - and what has dominated the news cycle, really -  was the spat over Greenland between Trump and the European leaders. And that has, in a way, eclipsed the war in Ukraine, actually. Is that your impression?

Rachman. Yes, basically. I think that one of the things about the Trump period is the news cycle changes incredibly fast. So, I knew I was traveling to Davos on Sunday. So on Friday, Saturday, I wrote a column about Iran, which if you remember, people were really quite concerned about and was a big issue and would Trump intervene. And then Saturday night, he says, "I've got to have Greenland, I'm going tariff Europe if I don't have Greenland." And suddenly I had to ditch my Iran column and move to Greenland, which then becomes the issue for maybe four days until it begins to be diffused after Trump's speech in Davos on Wednesday. But yes, I think I think it did. I mean, partly because of the sheer novelty of a US president threatening to annex part of a NATO ally's territory, not ruling out military force, and indeed, also threatening another round in the trade war. So the thing I then ended up writing on the Saturday night before heading off to Davos was a sort of off the cuff thing saying, "you know, Europe's really got to stand up to Trump on this one." And I was surprised that a lot of people who I think in the old days would have said to me, "calm down, old boy, it's fine, we'll sort it out," did not take that attitude. They they tended to agree with the column. So that even somebody from the European Business Roundtable came up to me and said, 100%, "have you seen, we've issued a statement along the lines of what your column said." Which again is unusual for business people who above all are usually the ones who are trying to calm things down. So it was a very dramatic intervention by Trump, and then obviously building up to the fact that the guy is speaking in Davos on Wednesday, and literally nobody knew what he was going to say, and for the first 20 minutes of his speech, it was a kind of ramble about his usual variety of obsessions, and then he suddenly gets to the Greenland bit, and everyone of goes [sharp intake of breath], and he says - and this is, I think, one of the few points where he's actually reading off the teleprompter rather than just rambling - "I'm not going to use force. I'm not going to use force." And that sort of takes...a lot of attention out of the situation. But then there was still this question of what he was going to do. And OK, I'm not going to pat myself on the back as we were walking out. I had to write immediately because I didn't have time. I literally had time to talk to a few people as we were walking out and I had to go and write something. So I said to a couple of colleagues, not FT colleagues, "I think he's climbed down and not just on military force, because the fact he didn't mention the tariffs, didn't reiterate the tariffs threat, says to me [that] he may even back off on that." But people said, "well, I'm not so sure about that. That's a bit premature," et cetera. Anyway, I wrote this. And a couple of hours later, he then did pull the tariffs. So it really was a pullback by Trump. But I think you're right - as a result, Ukraine was a bit overshadowed. Although if you talk to a lot of the kind of serious diplomats, Europeans, and so on, they were still thinking about it. It was still a big issue. It wasn't necessarily the thing on the front pages, but there was a lot of interest in the fact that these peace talks were going to start, Zelensky coming to Davos, where were the Americans, et etc., etc. So it's not like it had disappeared off the politicians' and diplomats' agenda, but it wasn't dominating the news, no doubt.

Gabuev. Before we continue, I would urge everybody to hit the subscribe button in order not to miss any episode of this show. Gideon, I remember that you interviewed Finland's President Alexander Stubb on stage, and that's also an episode of the podcast, where he says that this nightmarish scenario is unlikely but not impossible of the US using force on Trump's instruction to get Greenland, but that's something that he didn't want to talk [about]. I think that he was very persuasive in driving the point home that, oh, we should not get our eyes off the ball in Ukraine, because that's what's really important for us. But what I've heard, at least, correct me if I'm wrong, is that European leaders obviously had a contingency plan for tariffs, should Trump have made a move on them. A lot of these counter punches and the list of counter punches [were] prepared back last summer when the whole discussion between Trump and the European Union and the Commission was happening. But then the European Union leadership [made] a decision to just absorb this humiliating 15% tariffs and not use any leverage that they had. Now, this kind of toolbox of pressure on how to inflict pain on the U.S. is back in discussions, like they didn't need to use that. But then I didn't hear any contingency planning for Ukraine. What if Trump pulls the rug out [from under] Zelensky and then hang him dry without the U.S. intel and weapons, a scenario we've seen during the famous meeting between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office. Do you think that the Europeans had a contingency plan for this scenario as well?

Rachman. I think that they've been working on trying to get themselves in a better position if that were to happen again, really since the showdown between Zelensky and Trump more or less a year ago now, I guess it was, February 2025. And so they're not 100% ready for it. But I think they think they're in a better position that you can never quite tell because firstly, I don't fully myself understand the capabilities that are required. And also, there's always an element of propaganda and talking things up and so on. I think I saw - you probably saw - that Macron said that France now provides 80% of the intelligence for Ukraine.

I tried that out on some of the Brits who, I'm afraid, laughed and said they hadn't heard that. But the old Anglo-French rivalry is always there in the background. But I think that even the British and some of the other Europeans think that American intelligence is still very important, but it's decreasingly important, and that within a few months' time, Ukraine could actually cope without it. I don't know technically what's going on, but that's the talk: that they they think that's the case. For the moment, I think there's still confidence that America will sell them the weaponry that they can pass on to Ukraine. Also, a lot the drone production is now domestic Ukrainian stuff, and that's really the most important thing. And artillery, which again is very important, Europe is now producing quite a lot of that, the shells and so on. There was this big IPO just for a Czech artillery producer just last week. It's still not ideal by any means if America were to pull out, but I think it's less scary than it was a year ago.

Gabuev. Yeah, I will need to check with my colleagues, Mike Kofman and Dara Massicot, who I don't think are that optimistic. They still say that the U.S. provides really crucial intelligence for early warning about the Russian air raids and maintenance for everything that has been supplied, plus the intelligence for long-range fires that Ukrainians are using. Like, these are mostly American systems, although the Brits also provide their Storm Shadows, and these are known as scalps.

Rachman. Yeah and obviously the Europeans have a built-in incentive to play down their reliance and to play down the threat to Ukraine. So that sounds entirely possible.

Gabuev. One area where people have been worried about Ukraine's vulnerability was this combination of Russian barbaric - I cannot use other words - air assaults against civilian infrastructure, mostly power generation, and the lack of air defenses or non-sufficient amount of air defenses that has been on my concern list, like very top throughout 2023, 2024, 2025. Then Ukraine was blessed that it had [a] certain amount of air defenses and the winter was not that cold. This was obviously not the case this year. The pictures that you see from Ukraine, or stories I hear from friends and some relatives I have there are just horrible. I don't see that much preparation that the Europeans have made for that. Did you hear in Davos anything about contingency planning on how to handle this and the second order effect in particular - a potential new wave of migrants from Ukraine to the EU when people realize that next winter might be the same and it will be impossible to repair everything in the remaining 10 months?

Rachman. To be honest, no, I didn't hear that. I mean, obviously with most people I was having conversations with about Ukraine, I would raise the subject of what was happening in Kyiv or say, "isn't it remarkable [that] we're spending lot of time talking about Greenland or tariffs and here are all these people freezing in Kiev and in other Ukrainian cities." And people generally, their comments wouldn't go much beyond, "yes, isn't it awful? Hope they get the power fixed." So, no, I don't think there is much talk of new waves of refugees yet. There was just a general sense that to the extent we can help them, we've got to help them get the power back up, but nothing really that much more profound than that. I mean, I think towards the end of last week, more of the power came back up in Kiev, at least. But obviously it's vulnerable to being knocked out again.

Gabuev. Yeah, it's coming on and off again. I think that we will be able to assess the damage one once the winter is over. But I know that these lines to get the equipment from s Simmons or the Japanese producers are huge. The governments are trying to help the Ukrainians to jump the line and get the equipment. But it's really difficult. Reading your most recent column and hearing some Europeans talk in public and then speaking to them in private, my impression was that they are very upbeat about the war trajectory using the figure of Russian combat losses, the one that made it into your column: one Ukrainian for 25 Russians. Well, by those metrics, I'm wondering why Ukrainians are not storming Vladivostok or at least Moscow. Right. Or that, oh, the Russian economy is tanking, that the inflation is 30 percent. Right. If you use the first two weeks, that's [inaudible]. So I guess that most good experts I know, including some Carnegie colleagues, are disagreeing with those figures and deem them too optimistic. What's your explanation of this very upbeat rhetoric? Is it that Western leaders genuinely believe what they're saying in public? Or is it an attempt to pump more optimism? Who is the target audience here? Is it Trump? Is it their own population? Or are these Ukrainians?

Rachman. Well, good all good questions. Those figures, unless you've heard them cited publicly, tend to be what the advisor class and security officials say. The 30,000 a month figure - you did hear an echo of it in Trump's speech. Do you remember when he said this a terrible bloodbath. 

Gabuev. Yeah, this, I guess that this particular figure is correct. Like I've checked that with Kaufman and Massicot and they say, "yeah, like the figure is totally believable. What's unbelievable is that-"

Rachman. 30,000 Russian casualties in in a month. 

Gabuev. Yeah, that and wounded. I think that you combine that together, right? But then

Rachman. That's a staggering figure. The 1 to 25, okay, is an interesting one. That was something that, I'm sorry, I have to be a bit sort of vague about who said these things to me, but somebody who's pretty connected and official, I've been talking about the 30,000 with them. And then he just said, "well, while we're standing around, yeah, it's 25 to one." Then I thought, well, it was a good enough source that I'd put it in there. Then when it went to the fact checkers at the FT, they said, actually, "there's been a report along these lines citing British intelligence, and they say 27 to 1. Should we say 25 or 27?" So obviously, that number is out there and has been briefed to newspapers. And I said, "for God's sake, 27, 25. These things are not exact." But if it's even roughly that scale, it's interesting. The question is, I think, a very good question. Are these figures for real or are they propaganda? Maybe I'm a bit credulous. We'll put it this way. I think that it is part of the job of... security officials, foreign diplomats and intelligence agencies to manipulate the information environment, so it's not beyond question that they would maybe make stuff up or put it as positive a gloss on it as possible to get it out there. Why would they want to do that? I think if you're following that line then these figures are bit bogus. Yes, I think that the Europeans felt that the Americans in particular had built up this or bought or either built up the line that Russian victory is inevitable and that this was having a very negative effect on what people were prepared to do in negotiations, what they were prepared to ask of the Ukrainians, what they're prepared to ask of the Russians. It was creating a kind of defeatism that was dangerous. So it may be that they made a strategic decision that we've got to get those other numbers out there. Are those numbers totally made up? Now, this where you maybe think I'm a naive Westerner. I tend to think that my government wouldn't totally lie to me or, you know, the allied governments... The Americans I don't trust anymore under Trump. But there is a group of governments that I think would, probably...yeah, maybe I'm naive. I don't think they make it up and just just tell you any old rubbish. But that could be wrong. You know, maybe I've been taken for a ride.

Gabuev. Well, as a Russian, I'm very [much a] government skeptic from the very beginning. That's kind of built into our DNA that we believe that everybody lies, like Dr. House famously [said]. One to 27 with 30,000 killed and wounded would leave just 1,000 Ukrainians killed and wounded. So again, if that's the exchange rate - I'm sorry for this cynical language - they should be not only reclaiming their 1991 borders, but storming Moscow by now. I think that.

Rachman. Well, maybe maybe give it a couple of months, actually. Come on.

Gabuev. Yeah. Okay.

Rachman. It's interesting talking to these figures. The 27, as I say, has appeared in public. It wasn't just said to me. It was interesting talking to people about the 30 figure, which you seem to think is credible, because I shouldn't laugh. It is so horrific. But again, they would say it's good news. Then they sort of catch themselves and say, I don't know why I'm saying this. I mean, it's obviously appalling. But given what we're trying to achieve -

Gabuev. Yeah, it's horrible, but that's the aggressor and people are making conscious decisions. There are still options in Russia to not go to serve and so on. It's very clear who is the aggressor and who is the victim here. I think that my point has been all the time that if I see that figures are doctored and people are doing this rah-rah-rah, Ukraine's going to win, and they do that when the war is approaching its fourth sad anniversary - the full scale invasion, we are not even talking [about] the war since annexation of Crimea - that also creates this sense of disappointment in the public that people are so concerned. Like why are people thinking that AfD or Reform UK are telling them the truth about the war? Well, it's because people have been telling them from day one that Russia is diminished. It's a dwarf. We're going to discipline it and punish it. And you're going to see results very soon. And yet you don't see the results and you say "oh, this war needs to stop."

Rachman. I think, Sasha, you're giving too much credit to the average voter. I mean, how many people follow this stuff in detail, notice the figures? I think that the discourse is so debased now and the kinds of things that an AfD voter or a Reform voter might believe are often so detached from reality, I don't know, that Bill Gates has been implanting microchips into them or that COVID was a government conspiracy, etc, etc. So nuances of "have they overstated Ukrainian success?" I mean, God, if the debate was that elevated, I'd be happy.

Gabuev. Yeah, I think that my belief [has always been] that the misery of Russian underperformance, like their inability to turn the massive advantage they have into a decisive breakthrough and the ingenuity, the bravery of Ukrainians and the amount of Western help is the real story. And it's a good enough story to tell. The problem is that realistic assessment poses real policy questions to us, like how to bring Ukraine to the best possible place that's still married to reality. What kind of relationship we will face with Russia once it comes out of this war, aggrieved, more resilient. And then how to help Ukraine heal the wounds and what to put in place that a tragedy like this never happens again. But that's definitely beyond the scope of this conversation. You saw a lot of people at the World Economic Forum that were really obsessed last year about Russian frozen assets, including the FT columnist, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Did you hear any of this conversation resurfacing at Davos that, "oh, you know, we didn't get it last year, but we need to do it this year?" Or have they subsumed - because Europeans have ultimately discovered that they have a lot of fiscal space to pay for Kiev's war bills without touching the frozen assets of the Russian Central Bank?

Rachman. The only person I had a direct conversation with this was the Belgian Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, who was obviously at the centre of it all because of EuroClear and because of his opposition to just grabbing the money. He was on a panel that I was moderating and I asked him about it. He seemed to feel that - he didn't put [it] quite that directly - he'd won the argument. And he said people eventually realized [that] obviously nobody likes to raise money from their citizens, to increase taxes or increase debt. Nobody enjoys doing that. So there's a temptation to believe that, as he put it, there's a pot of gold sitting there that you can just open and it'll solve the problem. He said that was never really true. And it took a long time for people to realise that wasn't the case and that it would have repercussions that would be potentially unpleasant. and But he thinks that they've now moved on, at least for the lifetime of this new money package. Maybe he's hoping that they've moved on because it wasn't a pleasant episode for him. But that seemed to me a credible possible explanation.

Gabuev. Another discussion that's very much alive in Europe, and we are reading the great FT coverage of that, is whether the Europeans should now be part of the negotiations and talk to the Russians directly. Because [the] Americans and Ukrainians are talking. We saw this trilateral meeting in Abu Dhabi, whether the Europeans should finally speak with one voice. We see that the conversations on the security level have started to happen: intelligence agencies, the new head of MI6 just called her Russian counterpart, the head of German intelligence called Sergei Naryshkin. So this heavy lifting for channels of communication management on escalation, hybrid war, and so on, that my former boss, Bill Burns - my former boss at Carnegie, and then previously CIA director under Joe Biden -

Rachman. Thanks for clarifying that.

Gabuev. That's that's an important clarification. I think that Bill Burns and Jake Sullivan were in the lead, and now the Europeans are doing the same, and that's probably prudent. So the political track of this, whether this should be a conversation directly to Putin or to the Russian establishment, is still very much alive. Did you hear anything new, and where does this discussion stand?

Rachman. You put the idea in my head, actually, because you wrote a piece for the FT saying the Europeans should be talking directly to the Russians. If the Americans can do it, why can't the Europeans? So I asked Alex Stubb, the president of Finland, you mentioned I interviewed him on Monday night and it was an on-the-record interview. And he said, look... Yes, not opposed to the idea. But he said that what we cannot have is sort of freelance European initiatives where the French or the Germans or the Brits suddenly decide, oh, we've lost patience. that We're going to do it and we're going to get all the glory and whatever; that there is a feeling in Europe that they've been split too often by the Russians and that it's too important to let an individual country take the lead. So it has to be a joint European decision, not just to talk, but who does the talking and how. But he didn't say "that's outrageous, we'd never do that." So I think they are thinking about it. The trouble is, because there's such a variety of opinion within the European Union, and you have to keep the Estonians happy, and the Spanish happy, and the French and the Germans, it's difficult to actually decide, so it's possible that Europe's a little bit paralyzed. It did seem a bit odd to me that the European officials that I was talking to had all taken the opportunity if they could find it to grab hold of Witkoff or Kushner and say, "please say this in Abu Dhabi, please don't do that." But in the end, it was the Americans who were doing the heavy lifting and doing the talking. And I think [that's] partly because the Americans have made a very different call and have said, at least under Trump, that we are not on Ukraine's side, we're actually neutral arbitrators between Ukraine and Russia. I think the Europeans find that a bit shocking. But they can see there may be some sort of diplomatic utility to that. So that's what they're doing. Just on the sort of spies talking to each other, I think as far as I know, they always do. They always have. It slightly amazed me that heads of MI6 would sort of go off and meet their Russian counterpart in somewhere neutral and talk face to face. And I think that has continued. I mean, I could be wrong, but I think it's continued even throughout the war.

Gabuev. But I don't think that it was public knowledge that this happening on the senior most level, that is probably new. 

And of course, the spies want to be secretive about their dealings. But when I read the news, I felt really reassured. I feel in a better place because these peoples are these people are working the phones.

Rachman. Yeah, although I think that far as I can tell, the conversations with Mr. Naryshkin are not always the most rewarding conversations, but probably better to talk than not.

Gabuev. True. I don't know if you've had Bill Burns, but I think that he has spoken interestingly about his experience of dealing with Naryshkin. I was covering the Kremlin when Naryshkin was Medvedev's chief of staff, and he was in the Duma then, and oh yeah, he's not the easiest Russian to deal with, for sure. But talking about that, I think that my final question is back to Davos and broader gatherings like this that have global claim, like the Munich Security Conference, when we're going to see each other soon. Russia has always been a big participant. In Munich, that has been the feature to bring them in after the Cold War. And in Davos, they have always been a big participant, with the Russia session, the Russia House, splashing. Black Caviar, you saw all of the oligarchs.

Rachman. Their [inaudible] party, etc.

Gabuev. Exactly, exactly. All of that. so And then Davos and MSC and many other Western platforms have taken a stance that we will not invite Russians. Well, Davos has not invited Russians at all. I think that I was the first after the start of the full-scale invasion, and I also reside in Germany and don't travel back to Russia. MSC has made a policy to invite Russian opposition figures or experts who reside outside of Russia, like my colleagues. Is this a wise approach? Because the Russians and the Westerners and the Ukrainians are now meeting in places like Abu Dhabi or Doha, or they travel to Raisina Dialogue, where these platforms increasingly marginalize themselves in being this opportunity for candid conversations, not embracing the people who support the war and who are pure propagandists, but somebody who is still there, who knows the situation the ground, who maybe has access to the Kremlin and could be a useful source for information and also a useful conduit for passing messages along. What's your view on this?

Rachman. I think you're right that it's kind of a lost opportunity in some ways, but you live in Europe, you know you understand that the strength of sentiment, and so it's a difficult bridge to cross, to say, "welcome back, guys," when the war is still going on. I think, right or wrong, I can't see it happening. I was all prepared to write a kind of obituary of Davos, to be honest. But actually, this was the biggest and most international attention [it has had] for a very, very long time. Basically because of Donald Trump. I think if Trump hadn't come, half the American CEOs wouldn't have come. And then you might have all felt a bit sad, it was just Europeans talking to each other. But actually, the fact that Trump did come gave it this kind of big relevance. It's true also that, as you suggest, you can see almost the arc of the end of the Cold War and then the revival of antagonisms through Davos. When I first started going there, now 20 years ago, the Russians were a big deal. They had a good time. They were very visible. The only time I actually sat in a room with Putin was in Davos. I think it was 2009 or 2008. He was prepared at that point to sit with a bunch of Western journalists I assume he vaguely despised in the back room of a three-star hotel and chat for an hour and a half. That would not happen now. So it's a loss for both sides. And, obviously, yeah, lots of people. I remember meeting Deripaska there, Mordashov. I remember the first time the Russians unveiled Medvedev when he was going to be the guy who came in as president. There was a big dinner, you know, where... I don't know whether it was yet official, but everybody knew that's what happened. He was sort of being presented to the to the West as our new leader. And there was a kind of real buzz in the air. That's all gone now. Will it come back at some point, if Davos still exists? I think Russia will last longer than Davos. But Davos is still a thing and there'll be an end to the war and people will rebuild relations. But... It may have to wait for a post-Putin era. I can't imagine Putin himself - I mean, maybe it's just a failure of imagination my part - [will] be coming back as a kind of honored guest at Davos. And all guests are honored at Davos. It's all very over the top. "We're so delighted to have you here." That kind of thing is hard now. But when there's a new face, even if the new face was actually part of the old regime, just for presentation purposes, it can't be Putin. But anybody else, a new situation, I think people would be very keen to have the Russians back. But the situation has to change.

Gabuev. Yeah, the question on my mind now, after I hear you talk, is what happens first? That you will welcome some Russians from Russia connected to the regime to Davos first? Or are you allowed to go back to Russia since you are on the Russians' enemy blacklist. 

Rachman. Who knows? I mean, I think that it's possible that, look, what has to happen is there has to be a ceasefire and it has to last for a while. And some of the fear that the Russians are poised to attack us has to diminish a bit. And then, sure, I think, just like Netanyahu now, because he's got the ICC charges against him, [it's] very hard to see him travelling to Davos, but plenty of Israelis go. Now, obviously, Israel was never in the doghouse in the same way as Russia. But, yeah, I think particular individuals become toxic, but it's easier to welcome back countries. And by and large, although I know there's a Russian nationalist view among some people that the West wants to destroy Russia, et cetera, et cetera, I think actually most people... There is a constituency like that, maybe in the Baltic states, who think that Russia is always, always going to be a danger, and until the country is somehow reinvented, they're never going to be acceptable. But that is a minority view. I think most Westerners prefer a quiet life. They'd like to be able to go to Moscow. They'd like high-spending Russians back in their cities. If we could somehow get back to that, then maybe we would be good. But that brings us back to the broader question that Mark Carney raised actually in the context of Trump. Is this a rupture? Have things changed absolutely fundamentally? Or is this just kind of a weird period that we're going to get through and will somehow go back to the old world? Now, Carney's answer as applied to Trump - not that he said it was specifically Trump, but that's who he clearly was talking about - is no. Even if Trump goes, things are changed. And I think in a sort of mini way, that applies to Russia as well. It's the same question.

Gabuev. I agree with you. And unfortunately, before the guy goes, it could be a long time. Well, we heard him on a hot mic musing with Xi Jinping and Lukashenko and Kim Jong-un [about] living till 150. I hope that doesn't happen, but it could be quite some time. He is pretty young by Trump's metrics, very active, very healthy, entirely all too healthy, as Bill Burns would say.

Gabuev. and what comes after that, after a quarter-century rule right now, and the reinvention of the Russian elite, the emergence of a generation of people who run the security ministries and the military who have maybe never been to the West, don't speak foreign languages, don't have any friends to text in the middle of the night, watching different movies and so on, and are so disengaged from European identity or just scratching these wounds that "we are the true Europeans, not these guys," that reestablishing some form of dialogue and a managed relationship that doesn't produce tragedies like Ukraine is not impossible to see, but very hard to see. So it's long before next year in Moscow, for sure, but definitely next year in Davos. Thank you so much for being with us, Gideon.

Rachman. Thank you, Sasha. It's a pleasure talking as always.

Gabuev. And I hope that everybody will be with us in two weeks. Thank you and goodbye.